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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Eight federal circuit courts have held that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v.
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), compels the conclusion that an attorney who ignores his or
her client’s request for an appeal is ineffective, regardless of whether the client waived his right
to appeal as part of a plea agreement. Mr. Garza waived his right to appeal as part of his pleas to
aggravated assault and possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, but told
his attorney to appeal anyway. His attorney declined to do so. Mr. Garza then filed petitions for
post-conviction relief, alleging his attorney was ineffective for failing to appeal. The district
court rejected the majority view that a client is prejudiced in such a circumstance, and instead
denied Mr. Garza’s petitions after concluding that he did not present any non-frivolous grounds
for his appeals. Because the only required showing of prejudice is that, but for the attorney’s
refusal, the client would have appealed, the court erred by dismissing Mr. Garza’s petitions.
This Court should remand to the district court with an order that it grant Mr. Garza’s petitions so
that he can pursue his appeals.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
This consolidated appeal involves two underlying convictions and two post-conviction
petitions.

In Ada County Case No. CR-2014-9960, Mr. Garza entered an Alford1 plea to

aggravated assault (the “assault case”). (R., pp.101–12.)

In the binding Idaho Criminal Rule

11(f)(1)(C) plea agreement, Mr. Garza “waive[d] his right to appeal and waive[d] his right to
request relief pursuant to ICR 35.” (R., p.104.) In the guilty plea advisory form, Mr. Garza

1

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
1

checked “yes” when asked if he had waived his right to appeal his judgement of conviction and
sentence as part of his plea agreement. (R., p.109.) At the entry of plea hearing, the court did
not discuss whether Mr. Garza was waiving his right to appeal. (See generally R., pp.124–27.)
In Ada County Case No. CR-2014-18183, Mr. Garza pled guilty to possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to distribute (the “possession case”).2 (R., pp.89–100.) In
the binding Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f)(1)(C) plea agreement, Mr. Garza “waive[d] his right to
appeal and waive[d] his right to request relief pursuant to ICR 35.” (R., p.91.) In the guilty plea
advisory form in this case, unlike in the assault case, Mr. Garza checked “no” after the question
“[h]ave you waived your right to appeal your judgement of conviction and sentence as part of
your plea agreement?” (R., p.97.) At the entry of plea hearing, the court did not discuss whether
Mr. Garza was waiving his right to appeal. (See generally R., pp.128–30.)
At a joint sentencing hearing on both cases, the district court accepted the plea
agreements and sentenced Mr. Garza to consecutive sentences of five years, with two years
fixed, in the assault case, and five years, with one year fixed, in the possession case. (R., pp.89,
101, 113–21, 132 (Tr., p.32, L.9–p.45, L.1)). The court acknowledged that Mr. Garza had
waived his right to appeal, but both the prosecutor and the court agreed that the court should still
advise Mr. Garza of his appeal rights, and the court did so. (R., p.132 (Tr., p.35, Ls.6–21).) The
court also informed Mr. Garza of his right to appeal in the judgments of conviction. (R., pp.115,
118, 121.)

2

These pleas were part of a global agreement which included a third case, Ada County Case No.
CR-2014-9959, and other unfiled charges. Mr. Garza was to plead guilty to three misdemeanors
in Case No. CR-2014-9959; the State dismissed part II of the informations in the assault and
possession cases, agreed not to file a new case charging Mr. Garza with burglary and grand theft,
and agreed not to proceed on any persistent violator enhancements; and an agent with the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agreed not to refer Mr. Garza for federal prosecution for
possessing ammunition. (R., pp.90, 102.)
2

Mr. Garza then filed two petitions for post-conviction relief.3 (R., pp.5, 205.) Among
other things, both petitions alleged his trial attorney was ineffective for not filing notices of
appeal. (R., pp.6–7, 10–11, 206–07, 210.) He asserted in his affidavit related to the possession
case that he asked his attorney to appeal the case (R., p.10), and in his affidavit related to the
aggravated assault case he said his attorney “failed to file an appeal within 42 day limit after I
continuously reminded him via phone calls and letters” (R., p.210). As relief, he asked that the
court run his sentences concurrently. (R., pp.7, 207.)
The court appointed an attorney to represent Mr. Garza and issued a notice of its intent to
dismiss all but one of Mr. Garza’s claims.

(R., pp.26–34, 226–235.)

After both parties

responded to the court’s notice (R., pp.42–44, 57–60, 243–44, 258–61), the court dismissed all of
Mr. Garza’s claims except the claim of ineffective assistance regarding the notices of appeal.
(R., pp.62–65, 263–66.)

The dispute from that point forward focused on (1) whether

Mr. Garza’s attorney was deficient for failing to file the appeal; (2) whether Mr. Garza needed to
present non-frivolous grounds for appeal in order to prove prejudice; and (3) what issues
Mr. Garza could raise on appeal. (R., pp.75–85, 158–62, 172–82, 273–89, 367–77.) The parties
appear to have agreed on the important facts. (R., pp.148, 352 (an affidavit of Mr. Garza’s trial
counsel, submitted by the State, explaining: “Mr. Garza indicated to me that he knew he agreed
not to appeal his sentence(s) but he told me he wanted to appeal the sentence(s) of the court.
Mr. Garza received the sentence(s) he bargained for in his ICR 11(f)(1)(c) Agreement. I did not
file the appeal(s) and informed Mr. Garza that an appeal was problematic because he waived his
right to appeal in his Rule 11 agreements.”).)

3

The petitions are largely identical, and their differences do not matter to this appeal. The two
petitions were never consolidated, but it appears that, with the exception of the initial petitions
filed on June 22, 2015, the filings in each case are identical.
3

The court decided that Mr. Garza needed to present non-frivolous grounds for appeal in
order to show prejudice, and therefore had not shown his attorney was ineffective. (R., pp.183–
92.) It began by explaining that:
The parties agree on the following key facts: (i) Garza entered into I.C.R.
11(f)(1)(C) plea agreements in which he waived the right to appeal; (ii) he asked
his trial counsel to file appeals, despite having received the bargained-for
consecutive sentences and despite having waived his right to appeal; and
(iii) because of the appeal waivers, his trial counsel declined to act on his request
to file appeals.
(R., pp.187, 382.) Therefore, there was no factual dispute for the court to resolve. (Id.)
The court’s decision focused on the second prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984): Whether Mr. Garza needed to present non-frivolous grounds for appeal in order to
prove prejudice, or whether he could prove prejudice by merely showing that, absent his
attorney’s refusal to file a notice of appeal, he would have done so. 4 (R., pp.188–91, 383–84.)
The court next recognized that the question is undecided in Idaho;5 eight federal circuit courts
have concluded that a client is prejudiced when his attorney ignores his request for an appeal,
even if the client waived his right to appeal; and two federal circuit courts, as well as the district
courts within a third circuit, had concluded that it is not ineffective assistance for an attorney to
refuse to file a notice of appeal when the client had waived that right. (R., pp.188–89, 383–84.)
But the court believed that the minority rule was “better reasoned” and therefore held that a
client who has waived his appellate rights must affirmatively show non-frivolous grounds for

4

The court noted that typically it is deficient performance for an attorney to fail to file a notice
of appeal when the client requests one. (R., p.189 n.2, 384 n.2.)
5
The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished decision, has held that an attorney was not ineffective
for not filing a notice of appeal where the plea agreement waived the right to appeal, there was
no evidence that the State breached the plea agreement, and the plea was knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary. Garcia v. State, No. 41248, 2014 WL 7013214 (Idaho Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2014);
see also R., pp.188, 383.

4

appeal to prove prejudice.

(R., pp.190–91, 384–86.)

The court went on to explain that

Mr. Garza had not met that burden (R., pp.191, 386), and denied his petitions (R., pp.194, 389).
Mr. Garza timely appealed. (R., pp.196–97, 391–92).

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Garza’s petition because, regardless of the appeal
waiver in this case, Mr. Garza’s attorney was ineffective by refusing to file an appeal even
though Mr. Garza requested one?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Garza’s Petition Because, Regardless Of The Appeal
Waiver In This Case, Mr. Garza’s Attorney Was Ineffective By Refusing To File An Appeal
Even Though Mr. Garza Requested One
A petition for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345,
361 (2013). The district court can summarily dismiss or grant a petition for post-conviction
relief if “there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). This Court freely reviews whether the facts meet
constitutional standards. Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 361.
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14
(1970)). For a client to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he must generally
show that (1) his attorney’s performance did not meet “an objective standard of reasonableness,”
and (2) his attorney’s substandard performance prejudiced him. Id. at 687–88.
Neither the Idaho Supreme Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court have squarely decided
whether an attorney is ineffective for failing to appeal a case in which the defendant requested an
appeal despite having waived the appeal as part of a plea agreement. But the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), indicates that, in such a situation,
the attorney is deficient and prejudice is presumed. Indeed, eight of the ten federal circuit courts
that have considered this question have held that, regardless of a waiver, Flores-Ortega compels
that conclusion.

7

The district court erred by denying Mr. Garza’s petition. It is undisputed that Mr. Garza
told his attorney to appeal, but his attorney declined to do so. Therefore, Mr. Garza’s attorney
performed deficiently and prejudiced Mr. Garza. Because there is no factual dispute for the
district court to resolve, Mr. Garza asks that this Court remand to the district court with an order
that it grant Mr. Garza’s petition.
A.

Mr. Garza’s Attorney Performed Deficiently By Failing To File An Appeal When
Mr. Garza Instructed Him To Do So
The Flores-Ortega Court set forth the framework for determining whether an attorney

was ineffective for failing to appeal a case. As to the first Strickland prong, the Court reiterated
that “a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a notice of appeal
acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable,” and thus performs deficiently. FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. at 477; see also Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356 (Ct. App. 1994). Although the
client in Flores-Ortega had not waived his right to appeal, eight federal circuit courts have
concluded that it is deficient performance for an attorney to ignore his or her client’s desire to
appeal, regardless of an appeal waiver.

See Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 357–59

(6th Cir. 2012); Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 963–64 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Tapp, 491 F.3d 263, 265–66 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 269 (4th
Cir. 2007); Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 2006); Gomez-Diaz v.
United States, 433 F.3d 788, 791–93 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d
1193, 1196–98 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1265–67 (10th Cir.
2005).
As explained by the Fourth Circuit,
[T]he Court in Flores-Ortega stated that, once an attorney is unequivocally
instructed to file a timely notice of appeal, he is under an obligation to do so.

8

Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477. Under the Court’s holding in that case, it is only
when the defendant either does not make his appellate wishes known or does not
clearly express his wishes that an attorney has some latitude in deciding whether
to file an appeal. Id. at 478–80. Simply put, Flores-Ortega reaffirms the timehonored principle that an attorney is not at liberty to disregard the appellate
wishes of his client. See Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 28
(1999) (“[W]hen counsel fails to file a requested appeal, a defendant is entitled to
[a new] appeal without showing that his appeal would likely have had
merit.”); Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969) (holding that an
attorney who disregards his client’s instruction to file a timely notice of appeal
acts in a professionally unreasonable manner).
Poindexter, 492 F.3d at 269 (internal citations reformatted, emphasis added); see also SandovalLopez, 409 F.3d at 1197 (explaining that if a client “explicitly told his lawyer to appeal his case
and his lawyer refused, then we are required by Flores-Ortega to conclude that it was deficient
performance not to appeal.”). Indeed, many of these circuit courts, citing to Flores-Ortega,
treated deficient performance as foregone conclusion. See Watson, 493 F.3d at 963; Tapp,
491 F.3d at 265–66; Campusano, 442 F.3d at 773; Gomez-Diaz, 433 F.3d at 792–93; Garrett,
402 F.3d at 1267.

Admittedly, “[t]his proposition may amount to saying ‘it is ineffective

assistance of counsel to refuse to file a notice of appeal when your client tells you to, even if
doing so would be contrary to the plea agreement and harmful to your client,’ but that is the law
on filing a notice of appeal.” Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1197.
In this case, it is undisputed that Mr. Garza asked his attorney to file a notice of appeal
and that his attorney did not do so. (R., pp.186–87, 352, 381–82.) Under Flores-Ortega, and the
vast majority of federal circuits applying Flores-Ortega to cases involving appeal waivers, that
was deficient performance.

9

B.

Mr. Garza Was Prejudiced Because, Absent His Attorney’s Refusal To File A Notice Of
Appeal, He Would Have Appealed His Case
As to the second Strickland prong, the Flores-Ortega Court held that a client need only

show that, “but for counsel’s deficient conduct, he would have appealed.” Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. at 486. This is because, in such situations, “the violation of the right to counsel rendered
the proceeding presumptively unreliable or entirely nonexistent.” Id. at 484. “[I]t is unfair to
require an indigent, perhaps pro se, defendant to demonstrate that his hypothetical appeal might
have had merit before any advocate has ever reviewed the record in his case in search of
potentially meritorious grounds for appeal.” Id. at 486. Therefore, a client need not make any
additional showing of prejudice. He instead satisfies the second prong by merely showing that
he actually requested that his attorney appeal, or by “demonstrat[ing] that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would
have timely appealed.” Id. at 484.
Relying on Flores-Ortega, eight federal circuit courts have held that a client who waived
his right to appeal must only show that he instructed his attorney to appeal in order to prove
prejudice under the second prong of Strickland.6 See Campbell, 686 F.3d at 357–60; Watson,

6

A handful of these cases involved partial waivers, but it does not appear that their conclusion
would have been different if the client waived the right to appeal generally. See Poindexter,
492 F.3d at 269–73 (in which the defendant waived the right to challenge only his sentence, but
the court framed its holding and explained its reasoning in terms of appeal waivers generally, not
just limited waivers); Gomez-Diaz, 433 F.3d at 793 (“If the evidence establishes either that
Petitioner’s attorney acted contrary to his client’s wishes, or that he failed to fulfill his duty to
attempt to determine his client’s wishes, prejudice is to be presumed, and Petitioner is entitled to
an out-of-time appeal, regardless of whether he can identify any arguably meritorious grounds
for appeal that would fit one of the exceptions contained in his appeal waiver.”); Garrett,
402 F.3d at 1266 (“[m]ost courts . . . have held that a defense attorney does not render ineffective
assistance by failing to file a notice of appeal where the defendant has effectively waived his
right to appeal. This proposition cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s holding
in Flores-Ortega . . . . In fact, whether or not Mr. Garrett instructed his attorney to file a notice
10

493 F.3d at 964; Tapp, 491 F.3d at 265–66; Poindexter, 492 F.3d at 269–72; Campusano,
442 F.3d at 774–75; Gomez-Diaz, 433 F.3d at 793–94; Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1197–98;
Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1266–67. In other words, “[t]he prejudice in failure to file a notice of appeal
cases is that the defendant lost his chance to file the appeal, not that he lost a favorable result that
he would have obtained by appeal.” Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1197. This is because
the presumption of prejudice in post-waiver cases “is not a matter of formalistic
compliance with a technical rule merely postponing the inevitable denial of relief
on the merits. Rather, it serves to safeguard important interests with concrete and
potentially dispositive consequences which can be guaranteed only by the directappeal process and the concomitant right to counsel.”
Campusano, 442 F.3d at 776 (quoting Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1265–66). This showing of prejudice
applies regardless of the scope of the waiver. See Campbell, 686 F.3d at 358 (“even the broadest
waiver does not absolutely foreclose some degree of appellate review”); Sandoval-Lopez,
409 F.3d at 1195 (granting the client’s request for relief, even though the waiver before it was
“about as solid a waiver of the right to appeal as can be imagined”); Tapp, 491 F.3d at 266
(“[T]he rule of Flores-Ortega applies even where a defendant has waived his right to direct
appeal and collateral review.”); Campusano, 442 F.3d at 775 (“Our precedents take very
seriously the need to make sure that defendants are not unfairly deprived of the opportunity to
appeal, even after a waiver appears to bar appeal.”).
Further, the various policy justifications for the two different standards of prejudice favor
requiring only a showing that the client would have appealed but for the attorney’s failure to file
a notice of appeal. First, it is a client’s decision whether to appeal, regardless of whether the
attorney believes it is in the client’s best interest.

See I.R.P.C. 1.2(a).

Declining to find

of appeal is the crux of his [28 U.S.C] § 2255 case.”) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
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prejudice in such a situation would undermine “the principles of the Sixth Amendment by
allowing attorneys who believe their clients’ appeals to be frivolous simply to ignore the clients’
requests to appeal.” Campusano, 442 F.3d at 776. Second, the slim odds of a client who had
waived his right to appeal actually prevailing on that appeal does not justify denying collateral
relief. As the Second Circuit explained,
applying the Flores–Ortega presumption to post-waiver situations will bestow on
most defendants nothing more than an opportunity to lose. . . . But rare as they
might be, such cases are not inconceivable, and we do not cut corners when Sixth
Amendment rights are at stake. A defendant who executes a waiver may sign
away the right to appeal, but he or she does not sign away the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.
We decline to adopt a rule that would allow courts to review hypothetical
appeals as a substitute for real appeals that have been blocked by attorney error.
Campusano, 442 F.3d at 777; see also Poindexter, 492 F.3d at 272 (“At the time he executed the
plea agreement, it cannot be said that, by agreeing to waive his right to appeal his sentence,
Poindexter was agreeing to waive the right to the effective assistance of counsel in pursuing an
appeal.”). Third, holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a client in fact instructed
his attorney to file a notice of appeal is less complicated and more efficient than having a
collateral-review court attempt to determine the merits of every possible ground for appeal.
See Poindexter, 492 F.3d at 272–73. That duty should be left to the appellate court. Finally, the
State still gets the benefit of its bargain if a defendant who waived his right to appeal
nevertheless files a notice of appeal. The State can hold the waiver against the defendant to
dismiss the appeal, or can argue that the defendant breached the plea agreement thus relieving
the State of its obligations under the plea. See id. at 271.
Flores-Ortega indicates, and the majority of federal circuit courts have held, that an
attorney who ignores a client’s request for an appeal is ineffective, regardless of whether the
client waived his right to appeal. Mr. Garza met his burden of proving deficient performance
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and prejudice because, but for his attorney’s refusal, he would have appealed his cases. The
district court erred by requiring a greater showing of prejudice, and by in turn denying
Mr. Garza’s petitions.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Garza respectfully asks this Court to remand to the district court with an order that it
grant Mr. Garza’s petitions so that he can appeal his cases.
DATED this 19th day of July, 2016.

_________/s/________________
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

13

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of July, 2016, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in the U.S.
Mail, addressed to:
GILBERTO GARZA JR
INMATE #76602
IMSI
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707
JASON D SCOTT
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
JOHN C DEFRANCO
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF
_________/s/________________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
MPW/eas»

14

